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RECENT CASES
Bankruptcy-Claims against and Distribution of Estates-Provability
of Claim for Liquidated Damages for Breach of Lease Made before Bank-
ruptcy-Bankrupt had contracted to lease as tenant, for a period of ten
years, a building belonging to petitioner, the lease reserving to the landlord the
right of re-entry in case the building should be vacated because of any act of
the tenant, who covenanted, in that event, to pay the difference between a new
lease made by the landlord and the reserved rental, but not the difference between
the reserved rental and the reasonable rental value. Bankrupt occupied for part
of the term, until receivers were appointed who disaffirmed the lease and vacated
the building. After the subsequent petition in bankruptcy, the landlord relet the
property for less than the reserved rental, and presented a claim for the differ-
ence between the rent reserved and the fair rental value for the remainder of
the term. Held, claim refused, upon the ground that it was uncertain at the time
of filing the petition in bankruptcy whether any liability would ever arise under
the covenant, to which petitioner is limited, since the premises had not at that
time been relet. Miller v. Irving Trust Co., U. S. L. Week, Dec. IO, 1935, at 24
(U. S. Sup. Ct. 1935).
In restricting petitioner to recovery under the covenant the Court reaffirmed
the judicial policy of denying claims in bankruptcy for future rents,1 although,
as was pointed out in a previous issue of this REVIEW, 2 such claims are not so
contingent as to be barred if of a different nature. The Court also repudiated
the distinction made by the dissenting circuit judge in Urban Properties, Inc. v.
Irving Trust Co.3 between breach of the lease before and after bankruptcy. The
problem has not yet been decided of how the courts will treat claims for future
rents arising under the specific amendment allowing provability of future rents.4
Bonds-Gold Clause-Right of Holder of Obligation of Foreign Gov-
ernment Alternatively Payable in American Gold Coin-Suppliants held
bonds issued in America by the British Government, of the face value of $iooo,
payable "at the option of the holder, either in . . . New York . . . in gold
coin of the United States of America of the standard of weight and fineness
existing February, 1917, or in . . . London, . . . in sterling money at a fixed
rate of 4.862 dollars to the pound." Joint Resolution of Congress, June 5,
1933, provided that all obligations payable in money of the United States "shall
be discharged upon payment, dollar for dollar, in . . . legal tender." 1 Sup-
pliants filed Petition of Right for declaration of their rights. Held, that the
obligation of the British Government was to pay in London in sterling money at
the agreed rate of exchange, calculated upon the face amount of the bond, the
alternative obligation to pay in New York in American gold coin being dis-
charged because of impossibility of performance. Matter of International Trus-
tee for Protection of Bondholders Aktiengesellschaft, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 7, 1935
(K. B. 1935).
I. See (1935) 83 U. oF PA. L. REv. IO2I.
2. Id.
3. 74 F. (2d) 654 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. granted, 295 U. S. 725, but dismissed on peti-
tioner's motion.
4. 47 STAT. 1468 (1933), II U. S. C. A. § 201 (a) (Supp. 1934).
I. 48 STAT. 112 (1933), 31 U. S. C. A. §463 (Supp. 1934).
(543)
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The court applied English law,2 but examined American law (as promulgated
by the United States Supreme Court in the Gold Clause Cases 3), as well as
circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract, as having a material
bearing upon the intent of the contracting parties.4  The conclusion reached was
that the "gold clause" of the contract indicated an intention to pay in gold coin,
rather than to use gold as a measure of value.5 In reasoning thus, the court
distinguished an important English case to a contrary effort,6 ignored two much-
quoted decisions of the World Court,7 and relied upon an interpretation of the
Gold Clause Cases which is questionable.8 Having determined this vexatious
question to its satisfaction, the court then proceeded to find that the Joint Resolu-
tion of Congress applied to foreign debtors-a view which has been followed in
a recent New York decision 9 -and likewise to foreign sovereign debtors.10 Thus,
payment in the United States in American gold coin was considered impossible,
thereby discharging one alternative method of performance, and leaving as the
only possible performance payment in England in English currency. By this
method, the court neatly side-stepped the problem as to whether or not a contract
alternatively payable in America in gold dollars or abroad in a foreign currency
is "payable in money of the United States" within the purview of the Joint
2. The general rule is that the obligation of a sovereign state is subject to the law of
that state only, regardless of where the obligation was contracted, or where it was to be per-
,formed. See Smith v. Weguelin, L. R. 8 Eq. 196, 213 (1869) ; Goodwin v. Robarts, I App.
Cas. 476, 495 (1876) ; Serbian Loan Case, Publicationg of the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice, Series A, Nos. 2o/21 (929) at 42.
3. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 294 U. S. 240 (935), 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 682;
Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330 (1935), 83 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 686; Nortz v. United
States, 294 U. S. 317 (935), 83 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 687.
4. Since the Gold Clause Cases were decided eighteen years after the bonds involved in
the principal case were issued, they could have little bearing upon the intent of the parties,
as the court in the principal case admitted.
5. "By the 'gold coin clause', the debtor is bound to pay in gold coin; in the case of a.gold value clause' he has to pay in paper, or at his option, in any other currency an amount
equal to the value of the gold coin fixed by the promise." Nussbaum, Comparative and Inter-
national Aspects of American Gold Clause Abrogation (1934) 44 YALE, L. J. 53, 55.
6. Feist v. Soci6t6 Intercommunale Bege D'l-lectricit6, [1934] A. C. 161, (1934) 82 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 533, 15 BRIT. Y. B. INT. LAW 187 (934) (holder of Iool bond payable in gold
of 1928 weight and fineness, entitled to legal tender, equal to gold value of xool of 1928
weight and fineness).
7. Serbian and Brazilian Loan Cases, Publications of the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice, Series A, Nos. 20/21 (1929), II BRIT. Y. B. INT. LAW 203 (1930) (French-
men owning bonds of Serbian Government payable in "gold francs", entitled to legal tender
equal in value to the specified amount of gold francs). One of the judges of the World
Court when these decisions were rendered was Mr. Hughes, who later, as Chief Justice of
the United States Supreme Court, delivered the majority opinion in the Gold Clause Cases.
8. American writers unanimously consider the Gold Clause Cases as adopting the "gold
value" interpretation of the gold clauses. See Pennock, The Private Bond Case as a Post-
ponement of the Real Issute (1935) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 194, 195, 209; Tolman, Review of
Recent Supreme Court Decisions (1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 166, 167, 170; Dawson, The Gold
Clause Decisions (1935) 33 MICH. L. Ray. 647, 653, 662; Hart, The Gold Clause in United
States Bonds (935) 48 HARV. L. REV. 1057, io6o, 1o8o, 5082, 1084.
9. Compania de Inversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mortgage Bank of Finland,
269 N. Y. 22 (1935). The Joint Resolution was held to apply to the obligation of a foreign
defendant, on the ground that Congress intended to establish a uniform monetary system.
Foreign decisions to the same effect were cited by the court (p. 32). A discussion of other
foreign cases will be found in Nussbaum, loc. cit. supra note 5.
Io. The principal case is the first to determine that the Joint Resolution is binding upon
foreign sovereign debtors obligated to pay in America with American dollars. It is to be
regretted that limited space will not permit more than a bare mention of this important phase
of the decision.
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Resolution-a question which has caused American courts to split."' Since the
"gold content" of $iooo at the 1917 level is equal to that of $1693 in present-day
dollars, suppliants contended that the rate of exchange should apply not to $Iooo,
but to $1693. The court held that this argument was untenable.12  In so decid-
ing, it would seem to have disposed of the controversy, regardless of whether or
not performance in America was deemed possible. The court's solution, based
upon the ground that payment in English pounds was not intended to refer to
the gyrations of the American dollar, seems consistent with common sense,
particularly since the rate of exchange was fixed by the contract. 3
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Validity of Amended Frazier-
Lemke Amendment to Bankruptcy Act-An Illinois farmer mortgagor peti-
tioned the court for appointment of a referee and trustee under amended
subsection (s) of section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act, commonly called the Frazier-
Lemke amendment,' which provides for continuance in possession of the debtor
for three years; continuing liens on the property; payment of reasonable rental
during the period of default; public sale of the property upon request of the
creditor, 2 the debtor having ninety days thereafter in which to redeem; and lastly
provides that the court may in its discretion liquidate the estate of the debtor if
it appears to it that the state of emergency has ceased to exist in the locality.3
Held, that the court would not assume jurisdiction, because the amended sub-
section involved a taking of existing rights in specific property, which constituted
a violation of the Fifth Amendment, as well as a denial of full faith and credit
to certain acts of the State of Illinois.4 In re Young, 12 F. Supp. 30 (S. D. Ill.
1935).5
ii. A bond issued in America calling for payment, at the holder's option, either in Amer-
ica in gold dollars, or abroad in foreign currencies, is within the meaning of the Joint Resolu-
tion, though the holder elected to demand payment abroad, when both parties are citizens of
the United States. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 244 App. Div. 634,
28o N. Y. Supp. 494 (Ist Dep't 1935). Contra: McAdoo v. Southern Pac. Co., io F. Supp.
953 (N. D. Cal. 1935) (provided bondholder exercises option of making demand abroad).
See (1935) 49 HARv. L. REv. 152.
12. As was observed by the court, under suppliants' contention, if the dollar depreciated
fifty per cent while the pound remained constant, the amount of undepreciated English cur-
rency payable would automatically be doubled, a construction so unreasonable that it could
not have been intended by the parties.
13. Logically, a fixed rate of exchange would probably apply to a definite number of dol-
lars, whereas a variable rate of exchange would most likely apply to a fluctuating number of
dollars.
I. Act of Aug. 28, 1935, c. 792, § 6, ix U. S. C. A. § 203 (s) (Supp. 1935).
2. The act says nothing as to the time when this public sale may be enforced, and the
mortgagor therefore argued that this meant that it could be effected at any time after the
court took jurisdiction. It is clear, however, that this interpretation of the phrase would
nullify the whole meaning of subsection (s), since the practical effect would be that the cred-
itor would immediately demand a sale. The court properly took the view that the public sale
could be effected at any time after the expiration of the extension period, and not before.
3. It has been suggested that a bankruptcy law operative in one part of the country and
not in another would be unconstitutional, and that the amended subsection will have that
effect if a court in one locality determines that the emergency has ceased to exist there and
courts in other localities do not so determine. The basis of the unconstitutionality is argued
to be a failure of geographical uniformity; but it would not appear that an essentially emer-
gency measure that is limited in operation to localities where such an emergency exists is
lacking in such uniformity. See A. B. A. J., Jan. 1936, p. i9.
4. ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 77, pars. x6-20, providing for foreclosure and fixing
the period of redemption. The court considered that these fixed the rights of the mortgagee,
and that an act attempting to alter them would deny these acts full faith and credit.
5. See also, to the same effect, It re Sherman, 12 F. Supp. 297 (W. D. Va. 1935) ; In re
Lowman, CCH Bank. Serv. No. 368o (C. C. A. 7th, 1935).
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The United States Supreme Court in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Radford 6 expressly declined to determine whether an act affording relief to
defaulting mortgagors was a valid exercise of Congress' bankruptcy powers,
but held the original Frazier-Lemke amendment invalid solely on the ground
that it violated the Fifth Amendment. The instant court likewise avoided the
former question. It interpreted the Radford case as holding that any taking of
existing rights in specific property by virtue of the bankruptcy power violates
the Fifth Amendment. Although the language used might so indicate," it is
questionable whether that case goes so far. From the terms employed by the
Radford case in distinguishing the earlier case of Home Building and Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell,9 it may be inferred that the true basis of distinction is the
reasonableness of the legislation involved. 10 It is settled that states may pass
moratory legislation if the rights of creditors are reasonably protected. 1 The
most objectionable provisions of the earlier Frazier-Lemke amendment were
those for redemption by the mortgagor upon payment of only the appraised
price of the property, and for the arbitrary period of the time extension. 2 Those
provisions have been abolished in the amended subsection. The instant court
condemned the section because it deprived creditors of the right to determine
when the sale of the property should take place, to control the property during
the period of default, and to receive a final deed to the property upon the expira-
tion of the period of redemption fixed by the state; the court refused to con-
sider whether the means used were reasonably connected with the end, or were
unduly harsh or arbitrary. But property rights have been taken away by
another section of the Bankruptcy Act that is not mentioned. 3 It does not
appear that any of the above rights are so fundamental that they need be con-
sidered inviolable.1 4  The amended section would therefore appear to come within
6. 295 U. S. 555 (1935).
7. Id. at 589. It is apparent that the purpose of the present section is the benefitting of
ihe debtor. It had heretofore been supposed that the purpose of the bankruptcy power was
the composition of estates for the benefit of creditors, but the Court in the Radford case in-
dicated that the limits of the power are not so narrow, and that a measure intended primarily
for the relief of the debtor rather than for the creditor does not necessarily fall without those
limits.
8. Id. at 589, 590. "But the effect of the Act here complained of is . . . the taking
of substantive rights in specific property acquired by the Bank prior to the Act."
9. 290 U. S. 398 (0934).
io. The Court in the Radford case pointed out that the Minnesota Act provided for dis-
cretion in the court as to the length of the time extension, and that once fixed it could be
reduced in case of a change of circumstances, while in the Frazier-Lemke amendment the
period was arbitrarily fixed at five years. The Court stated, at page 595: "Strong evidence
that the taking of these rights from the mortgagee effects a substantial impairment of the
security is found. . . ." This would imply that it is the "substantial impairment" of the
creditor's security rather the mere fact that some property rights are taken away, that is the
chief objection to the act. This is the same as saying that it is because his rights are not rea-
sonably safeguarded. On this general point see (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. R-v. 375, where the
conclusion is reached that "the unreasonableness of the amendment becomes . . . the ulti-
mate criterion."
ii. See (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REV. 375, 376, n. ii.
12. The provision permitting the mortgagor to retain his property upon payment of the
appraised price might be said to take from the mortgagee the very essence of his right; and
an arbitrary period of five years for extending the time for foreclosure might extend what is
deemed essentially an emergency measure long beyond the period of emergency.
13. The provision that transfers within four months of bankruptcy may be voided by the
trustee in bankruptcy. 44 STAT. 666 (1926), 11 U. S. C. A. § 96 (Supp. 1934).
14. It would appear that the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law takes away from
the creditor the right to control the property during the period of extension, to the same ex-
tent as does the amended subsection here !-- -ved. Although one is a state, and the other a
federal, act, the Fifth and Fourteenth .'..endments are said to be identical in application as
to due process. See Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312, 326 (1932).
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the boundaries set by the Blaisdell case, especially in view of the fact that the
most fundamental differences between the Minnesota legislation and the former
Frazier-Lemke amendment, as indicated by the Supreme Court, have been
eradicated.
Constitutional Law-Federal Taxation under the General Welfare
Clause-Constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment Act-The Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act I declared the existence of a national emergency pro-
duced in part by the decline of agricultural prices. It provided for benefit pay-
ments to farmers to induce them to enter into contracts to curtail production. In
order to meet these benefit payments and administrative expenses it further pro-
vided for a tax on the processing of certain agricultural commodities. The re-
ceivers of an insolvent processing corporation presented to the Court a report on
a tax claim assessed pursuant to the Act. On appeal,2 held (Stone, Cardozo and
Brandeis, JJ., dissenting), that the Act was unconstitutional as an attempt to regu-
late by taxation agricultural prices and production, matters not within the dele-
gated power of Congress. United States v. Butler, U. S. L. Week, Jan. 7, 1936,
at 373 (U. S. Sup. Ct. 1936).
The most striking feature of the instant case was that, despite its invalidation
of the government's agricultural program as beyond the power of Congress,3 the
Court purportedly adopted the Hamiltonian interpretation I of the federal taxing
power under the general welfare clause,G a view which maintains that the power
to tax to promote the general welfare is a substantive one, unrestricted in its
application by the specifically enumerated powers.6 Unfortunately the actual de-
1. 48 STAT. 31 et seq. (933), 7 U. S. C. A. 6oi et seq. (Supp. 1934), as amended by P.
L. No. 320, 74th Cong., ist Sess., 7 U. S. C. A. § 623 (Supp., Oct. 1935). The amendment
was designed to obviate the criticism that the Act was invalid as an unconstitutional delega-
tion of legislative power. The Court held that it was unnecessary, in view of its holding, to
consider the effect of the amendment.
2. The Act was upheld in Franklin Process Co. v. Hoosac Mills Corp., 8 F. Supp. 552
(D. Mass. 1934) under the commerce clause, U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This was re-
versed sub niom. Butler v. United States, 78 F. (2d) I (C. C. A. Ist, 1935) the Act being held
unconstitutional as an invalid delegation of legislative power. See (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 376, for a discussion of the decision in the district court.
3. The Court recognized that Congress might condition its appropriations on the bene-
ficiary's compliance with its expressed policy [cf. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447
(1923) ], but held that it could not condition them on the beneficiary's contracting to comply.
This differentiation seems more apparent than real; for if an offer of a bilateral contract is
economic coercion" it would seem to follow that an offer of a unilateral contract also is.
4. For a discussion of the contrary views of Hamilton and Madison on this subject, see
Corwin, Constitutional Aspects of Federal Housing (935) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 131. Pro-
fessor Corwin strongly espouses the Hamiltonian position. For a vigorous defense of the
Madisonian view that the power to tax to promote the general welfare is limited by the
enumerated powers (i. e., is merely an "instrumental" as contrasted with a "substantive"
power), see Post, The Coonstitutionality of Government Spending for the General Welfare
(1935) 22 VA. L. REV. I.
5. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. I.
6. The Court in adopting the Hamiltonian view cited STORY, COMMNTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION (5th ed. i8gi) § 9o7. But Story recognized fully the implications of the
Hamiltonian position; for in § 934 of the CommENTARrEs, in arguing in defense of the neces-
sity for this interpretation, he says, "We may have internal commotions. We may suffer
. . . from the gradual decline of particular sources of industry. . . . There ought to be
a capacity to provide for future contingencies, as they may happen." And in refuting the
contentions of his opponents that this view would destroy the State-Federal system he fur-
ther states, in § 944: "And in respect to the particular subject of taxation, there is quite as
much reason to suppose that there will be an adequate assemblage of experience, knowledge,
skill and wisdom in Congress and as adequate means of ascertaining the proper bearing of all
taxes, whether direct or indirect, whether affecting agriculture, commerce or manufactures,
as to discharge any other functions delegated to Congress. To suppose otherwise is to sup-
pose the Union impracticable or mischievous."
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cision can scarcely be reconciled with this reasoning. For although the Court
granted the Government's contention that the power to tax (and the correlative
power to appropriate) to promote the general welfare was not limited by the
enumerated powers, it expressly held that the power could not be exercised if it
interfered with the reserved powers of the states.7 But if Congress in utilizing
its power to tax cannot encroach on the powers reserved to the states even where
the general welfare is concerned, it would seem to follow that the only ends which
Congress can promote by the use of this power are those within the scope of its
delegated powers.
In other words, a substantive power delegated to Congress is limited in its
exercise by the powers reserved to the states.8 Thus the Court while purporting
to adopt a liberal construction of the federal government's taxing power has in
effect created merely an indefinite limitation on the exercise of this power, the
extent of which is known only to the Court itself. The total effect is to introduce
into the field of constitutional law the principle that the delegated powers of Con-
gress are restricted by the reserved powers of the states-a principle as vague in
its meaning as the due process clause,9 and one which in its application will ex-
tend tremendously the influence of the Supreme Court, the only body deemed
capable of ascertaining the proper limitations.'" All this in a field of law where
uncertainty results in the expediture of huge sums of money in the administra-
tion of what ultimately prove to be unconstitutional laws," and in the disruption
of an economic social structure geared over a period of several years to compli-
ance with the ill-fated federal legislation." The dangers inherent in such a situ-
ation might seem less real were they not so strongly expressed by the vigorous
dissenting opinion of one-third of the Supreme Court. 3
Constitutional Law-Full Faith and Credit-Divorce from Bed and
Board in Sister State as Ground for Absolute Divorce-Defendant obtained
a divorce a nensa et thoro from complainant in Virginia, the matrimonial domi-
cile, following an appearance by complainant. Florida statutes made it a ground
of divorce that "defendant has obtained a divorce from the complainant in any
other State",' but abolished divorces a mensa et thoroY Complainant, while
7. U. S. CONST. Amend. X. Cf. Plumley v. Massachusetts (The Oleomargarine Case),
155 U. S. 461 (1894).
8. This conclusion would seem more logical if the same Court had not already held that
Congress in exercising its power to regulate interstate commerce, may, if necessary, also regu-
late intrastate commerce, a field which would otherwise seem clearly "reserved to the states."
Houston, E. & W. Texas Ry. v. United States (The Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U. S. 342
(1914).
9. See Albertsworth, The Mirage of Constitutionalisn (1935) 29 ILL. L. Rxv. 6o8,613.
io. See CORWIN, THE TWIIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT (1935); cf. ARNOLD, THE
SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935) IOx.
ii. The cost of administering the National Recovery Act, which was held unconstitu-
tional in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (i935), is estimated to
have been $55,oooooo a year. N. Y. Times, May 29, 1935, at 14.
12. Recognition of the necessity of providing an immediate substitute for the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act in order to prevent a collapse of the farmer's purchasing power, has
created a problem of national concern. N. Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1936, at I. The confusion is
further enhanced by the Court's ruling that the taxes collected under the Act must be re-
funded to the processers. Rickert Rice Mills v. Fortenol, N. Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1936, at io
(U. S. Sup. Ct. 1936).
13. "Courts are not the only agency of government that must be assumed to have capac-
ity to govern." Stone, J., dissenting in the principal case. U. S. L. Week, Jan. 7, 1936, at
381.
I. FLA. COmmP. GEN. LAWS (Skillman, 1928) § 4983 (8).
2. Id. § 4982 (8).
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resident in Florida, thereafter sought a divorce a vinculo matrintonii in that
state. Held that the divorce be granted, because full faith and credit must be
given to the Virginia decree, and because the words, "divorce in any other State",
of the quoted statute include divorce from bed and board. Givens v. Givens, 163
So. 574 (Fla. 1935).
The court's reliance on "full faith and credit" in a case making a divorce
from bed and board the basis of a complete divorce suggests, at first, a serious
misapplication of principle. Thus, if placed solely on the full faith and credit
clause, the decision here would have contravened the rule that a foreign decree
need not be given greater force than it has in the state where rendered.3 More-
over, in the case of divorce decrees, the clause requires only that recognition be
accorded the operation of the first decree as severing or suspending the marriage
relation and establishing certain facts in regard thereto, and not that an addi-
tional decree be awarded.4 Accordingly, even if a divorce a mensa et thoro had
been available in Florida, and the court had determined to grant the foreign
decree full faith and credit,5 the proper method of recognition would have been
to admit the effectiveness of the Virginia decree in Florida rather than to grant
a new and superfluous divorce. 6 However, by deciding that the local statute,
independently of the full faith and credit clause, required the giving of an abso-
lute divorce when an effective foreign divorce from bed and board had been
obtained, the court in the instant case avoided the above-discussed errors. On
the remaining issue as to whether a valid divorce from bed and board had been
granted in Virginia, full faith and credit was clearly applicable; i. e, as the decree
was not subject to collateral attack in Virginia,7 Florida was bound to give it
similar effect.8 It may be, however, that the court misinterpreted the statute
of its own state, in assuming that the foreign decree of divorce must be valid
before it will constitute a ground of divorce within the Florida statute. The
chief reason for making a foreign divorce the ground for a domestic divorce '
would appear to be that the former-like adultery, desertion, etc.-indicates a
rift in the marital relation so great that the relation may be justifiably termi-
nated.10  If such be the case, no distinction can properly be drawn between void
and valid divorces, for the two are equally indicative of a break in the marriage
tie. Therefore while the court expressed valid principles of "full faith and
credit", application of those principles might have been totally unnecessary under
a more accurate construction of the local statute.
3. See Robertson v. Pickrell, iog U. S. 6o8, 61o (1883).
4. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 (igol) ; Harding v. Allen, 9 Me. 140 (1832);
Pearson v. Pearson, 23o N. Y. 141, 129 N. E. 349 (192o) ; cf. Hood v. Hood, iio Mass. 463
(1872).
5. Cf. i BEAxF, CoNF.CT OF LAws (935) § 114.1, where it is contended that ordering
a divorce from bed and board is not a judicial act. But this would clearly not prevent the
application of full faith and credit where, as in the principal case, all the requirements of
jurisdiction were present. Harding v. Harding, I98 U. S. 317 (,905).
6. In logic the granting of a new divorce is a denial of the validity of the first one; i. e.,
if the parties need a new decree in order to be divorced, the first decree must have failed to
accomplish that purpose.
7. Gum v. Gum, 122 Va. 32, 94 S. E. 177 (1917).
8. Harding v. Harding, 198 U. S. 317 (195); Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S. 551
(1913).
9. The social desirability of establishing such a ground for divorce is not within the
scope of this discussion. Obviously, it has many questionable aspects. Thus, in the instant
case, the husband was in one sense given a divorce because he had been adjudicated guilty of
desertion in Virginia. Principal case at 575. If a complete divorce has been granted else-
where, the inconsistencies would be increased. See note 6, supra.
io. Cf. Wright v. Wright, 24 Mich. 18o (1871). See also OHIo CODE (Baldwin, 1934)
§ 11979.
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Constitutional Law-Full Faith and Credit to Ruling of Attorney Gen-
eral-Transfer of Liberty Bonds-Bank promoters persuaded complainant
to deposit registered "non-negotiable" Liberty Bonds in X bank. Thereafter,
for a consideration, she assigned the bonds in blank,1 and authorized promoters
to represent them as part of Y bank's paid-in capital, so that the state authori-
ties would allow Y bank to open. Promoter borrowed on these bonds from
defendant bank, and defaulted. Complainant sued to recover the bonds or their
proceeds and to enjoin sale thereof by defendant. Held, for defendant, because
the court is under a duty to give full faith and credit to the rulings of the Attorney
General that one in the position of the defendant is the legal holder of such
bonds. Griffiths v. Hamblen Nat. Bank, 86 S. W. (2d) O99 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1935), cert. denied, Tenn. Sup. Ct., Oct. 12, 1935.
The instant case involved two interesting points. Registered bonds are
ordinarily not transferable by delivery alone; 2 and those issued to complainant
bore on their face no words of negotiability. Nevertheless a prior ruling of the
Attorney General of the United States had established a rule that such bonds as-
signed in blank should be treated as though payable to bearer. 3 While the validity
of such a conclusion rests solely upon rules and regulations of the Treasury De-
partment 4 adopted by virtue of a very broad empowering statute5 no question of
inability to issue such a regulation was raised. Practical reasons of policy sup-
port the result, among them the frequent use of Liberty Bonds as collateral-a
use which any other solution would hinder if not destroy. As respects the
second point, however, the court's interpretation of the term "full faith
and credit" was unfortunate. The application of this clause has been restricted
to matters involving states, and has not been considered conclusive as to
the effect a state should give federal action. A ruling of the Attorney Gen-
eral is not within the literal province of the constitutional section or of the case-
law exposition of its meaning. Too much fault should not be found with the
court, however, for a misuse of legal terminology, in view of the sensible solu-
tion reached. By virtue of the assignment in blank, the bonds were payable
to defendant insofar as the Treasury was concerned. Even if the court had seen
fit to grant complainant's prayer and had issued a suitable decree, its process
could not have compelled federal recognition of the validity of complainant's
claim.
Constitutional Law-Regulation of Trade or Business-Constitution-
ality of National Labor Relations Act-The National Labor Relations Act '
provides inter alia that proceedings may be instituted against any employer who
i. The taking of a false acknowledgment to complainant's signature was expressly de-
clared unimportant because defendant bank could have acquired "equitable rights to the bonds
upon the faith of the owner's indorsement in blank." Instant case at i1Oi.
2. In re Stockham's Estate, 193 Iowa 823, 186 N. W. 650 (1922) ; In re Bliss v. Bliss,
221 Mass. 201, lO9 N. E. 148 (1915) ; see Benwell and Everitt v. Newark, 55 N. J. Eq. 26o,
263, 36 Atl. 668, 669 (1897).
3. 34 OPs. A-r'y GEN. 262 (1924).
4. ". • . Registered bonds assigned in blank, or bearing assignments for exchange for
coupon bonds which do not restrict delivery, are in effect payable to bearer and lack the pro-
tection of registration, since title thereto may pass by delivery without further assignment."
Treasury Circular #300, paragraph 32, extract #12, paragraph 5 (July 31, 1923). See Opin-
ion of the Attorney General appended to instant case, at IIO2.
5. 40 STAT. 288, § I (1917), as amended by 40 SIAT. 502 (1918), and 40 STAT. 844
(I918), 31 U. S. C. A. §752 (1927).
i. P. L. No. r98, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935).
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refuses to bargain collectively with employee-selected representatives.2 Com-
plainants, owners and operators of a small flour mill in Missouri, raised the
issue of constitutionality in a bill to enjoin proceedings against them under the
Act for refusal to bargain collectively. Complainants received wheat from, and
shipped flour to adjacent states. Held, the entire Act is unconstitutional as an
attempt by Congress to regulate transactions not directly affecting interstate com-
merce. Majestic Flour Mills of Aurora v. National Labor Relations Board,
U. S. L. Week, Dec. 24, 1935, at io (W. D. Mo. 1935).
The government contended that complainants' conduct would arouse their
employees' dissatisfaction; that this would increase the possibility of strikes;
that strikes would reduce production; and that diminished output would obstruct
interstate commerce.3 Also advanced was the theory that the industrial relations
here were part of a "stream of commerce." 4 The court disposed of the first
contention by asserting that complainants' conduct did not fall within the regu-
latory power of Congress because it was not directly connected with interstate
commerce; 5 the second was defeated by the rather meretricious argument that
the mill stood between two streams-forming the terminus of a stream of incom-
ing grain and the source of a stream of outgoing flour., Considering the initial
point, one may well conclude that the Act is no bolder effort to supervise affairs
only indirectly affecting interstate commerce than many a previous statute was
in its time.7  Concerning the subsequent one, it should be remarked that Congress
may regulate sales of cattle at the Chicago stockyards,8 and of grain on that city's
Board of Trade, 9 as transactions representing part of a "current of commerce
among the states." "1 Extension of this doctrine to the facts of the instant case
would scarcely constitute a headlong leap into socialism, especially since it has
been repeatedly stated that Congress' power under the commerce clause" reaches
2. Other things denounced as "unfair labor practices" are: (I) interference by employer
with employees' right to organize; (2) employer's domination of, interference with, or
financial support to any labor organization; (3) discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment encouraging or discouraging member-
ship in any labor organization; (4) discharge of an employee for filing charges or giving
testimony under the Act. These are set out in § 8.
As to what practices-unfair as a practical matter-are permitted by the Act, see Note
(1935) 35 COL. L. REv. Iog8, IIoo-IIo6.
3. This argument is embodied in the elaborate findings of fact in § I of the Act itself.
4. See Holmes, J., in Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 398 (19o5) ; Ribble,
The "Current of Comnerce:" A Note on the Comnmerce Clause and the National Industrial
Recovery Act (1934) 18 MiNN. L. REV. 296.
5. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 542 et seq. (1935). But cf.
Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 521 (1922). See GAViT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE (1932)
§ I07, and especially § 88.
6. Further dicta by the court, in the form of a jeremiad bewailing the fact that the
American workman "is dealt with by the Act as incompetent" or as a "recently emancipated
slave", hardly merit being termed "arguments."
7. E. g., The Steamer Daniel Ball v. United States, Io Wall. 557 (1870) (licensing boat
operating on intrastate river, but carrying goods destined to go out of state) ; Head Money
Cases, 112 U. S. 580 (1884) (act of Congress requiring a per capita tax on immigrants to
take care of them). But cf. Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. I18 (199) ; Missouri v. Hol-
land, 252 U. S. 416 (1920) (the "migratory birds" cases). See pertinent discussion in GAVIT,
THE COMERCE CLAUSE (1932) 97. And that "directness" is a variable quantity, depend-
ent largely on external circumstances, see Ribble, supra note 4, at 315.
8. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375 (9o5) ; cf. Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v.
United States, 280 U. S. 420 (1930).
9. Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. I (1923).
IO. See note 4, supra.
ii. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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any practice which in the judgment of Congress itself 12 tends to restrain or
burden interstate commerce."2 Moreover, a single act of remote effect often,
upon widespread repetition, becomes a direct impediment, so that regulation of
the latter may be accomplished only by control over the former. 14 Addition to
the above considerations of the rapidly disappearing "presumption of constitu-
tionality" 15 will demonstrate that the instant decision was not inevitable even
under orthodox constitutional standards.16 Besides, the Act could readily have
been sustained by deciding merely that it was inapplicable to the situation under
notice. In view of the helpless plight of individual or unorganized employees,'t
economic and social factors,' as well as purely legal principles, provide further
reason for disagreement with the result of the present case.
Criminal Law-Husband and Wife-Liability under Non-Support Stat-
ute of Husband on Relief for Demanding Payment According to Work
Done-Defendant, unemployed applicant for relief, was convicted under a
penal statute providing for punishment of a husband who "unreasonably neglects
or refuses to provide for the support" of his family. The city Welfare De-
partment required, as one of the conditions of receiving relief payments, that
those on relief do work for the Department of Public Works on demand. De-
fendant consented to work only if paid a definite wage proportioned to the amount
of work he did.' Held, conviction affirmed, because it did not compel "involun-
tary servitude" within the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution.' Commonwealth v. Pouliot, 198 N. E. 256 (Mass. 1935).
Like most non-support statutes, the Massachusetts one expressly qualified
the husband's duty to work by a condition that the demands upon him be "reason-
12. See Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 521 (1922) ; United Mine Workers v. Coro-
nado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 408 (1922); Texas & N. 0. R. R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. &
Steamship Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 570 (1930).
13. Cf., e. g., Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194
(1912) ; Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 (1917) ; Ribble, supra note 4, at 312; GAViT, loc. cit.
supra note 7; see Note (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 1072, 1075-1077.
14. United States v. Ferger, 250 U. S. 199 (1919) (forged bills of lading) ; Stern, That
Commerce Which Concerns Mare States than One (0934) 47 HARv. L. REv. 1335, 1364, n.
125, 1365, n. 126.
15. See WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1929) §§ 26, 27; Corwin, Judicial
Review in Action (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. REV. 639, 645.
16. But see Bamberger, Is the National Labor Relations Act Unconstitutional? (0935)
40 Com. L. J. 570.
17. Cf. the language of Taft, C. J., in Amercan Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central
Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 209 (292) ; for expatiation on this, and lively general com-
ment on the Act and its critics, see Address of J. Warren Madden, N. L. R. B. Release No.
42 (Dec. 5, 1935).
18. For an exhaustive presentation of the economic factors involved see Note (1935)
35 COL. L. REv. lO98, particularly 1124 et seq.; cf. Mason, The Limits as to Effective Control
of the Employer-Employee Relationship (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 277.
I. MAss. GEN. LAws (Ter. ed. 1932) C. 273, § I. Such statutes, known as "Lazy Hus-
band Laws", are extremely common. For a table of their comparative provisions see 3 VER-
NIER, AmERIcAN FAMILY LAWS (1935) 118 et seq.
2. Apparently, defendant's demand was simply that he be paid at some fixed rate, re-
gardless of what it was. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that such payment at any
reasonable rate would have amounted to more than the ordinary relief allowance. In the first
eleven months of I93O, 55 Massachusetts municipalities applied for building permits repre-
senting an estimated aggregate value of S98,396,9I 9 in public works. SPECIAL REPORT ON
UNEMPLOYTTENT, MASS. DEP'T OF LABOR (1932) I9.
3. U. S. CONST. Art. XIII, § i. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States.
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able." 4  No previous case under a similar statute has been found which attempted
to define that elastic term, the closest analogy being a two-year-old Wisconsin
case which decided that defendant's refusal to work on relief unless he was paid
in cash, would not render him liable if he had refused in good faith, under an
honest (not necessarily reasonable) belief that the conditions imposed by the
relief board were "unjust or intolerable." 5 To be sure, that case purportedly
turned on a definition of the term "wilful." 6 But even assuming that conviction
under the non-support statute involved in the instant case, did not require a
criminal intent, one may well object to the decision on the basis of the objective
criterion of "reasonableness." This is a term, obviously, whose definition must
be sought in fields not solely legal; it requires consideration as to whether it is
a sound social policy which would require of one unemployed that in return for
maintenance at a lower than subsistence level," he submit unconditionally to any
conditions of labor which the state in its mercy may impose." That one so
hapless as to belong among the millions of unemployed must, to avoid the status
of a criminal, surrender the ordinary laborer's right to demand, not only a fair
or decent wage, but even a wage proportioned to his labor, is a proposition few
would sanction as regards a private employer. 9 Indeed, it is something like this
which, under the name of "peonage", has long been recognized as unconstitutional
under the Thirteenth Amendment.10 Peonage to the state is equally unjusti-
fiable."
4. E. g., Aiu. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 2596 ("without good cause"); Wis.
STAT. (1931) §§ 351.30, 351.31 ("without just cause") ; UNIF. DESERTION AND NON-SUPPORT
ACT (igio) § I ("without just cause").
5. Zitlow v. State, 213 Wis. 493, 252 N. W. 358 (1934), 9 Wis. L. REv. 425. A convic-
tion was affirmed, however, on the assumption that the jury must have found that defendant
acted inala fide, and not in accordance with a bona fide labor dispute.
6. "Wilful" has been held in similar statutes to refer to an act done with "evil intent or
legal malice." Brown v. State, 137 Wis. 543, 549, 119 N. W. 338, 340 (19o9) ; cf. Page v.
State, 16o Miss. 300, 303, 133 So. 216, 217 (1931).
7. The precise amount of relief payments to which defendant was entitled in the city of
Holyoke in 1933, has not been found; but some light may be thrown on their probable gen-
erosity by the fact that the 229,792 persons on relief in Massachusetts during the first three
months of 1931 received, from combined private and governmental sources, an average of
$5,469,7o8 as relief. SPIECIAL REPORT, U. S. CENSUS BUREAU (1932) 16, 25.
8. For the harmful economic and social effects of low wages not only on the individual
laborer, but on all workers and on society as a whole, see PATTERSON AND Sc IoIz, EcoNoMIc
PROBLEMS OF MODERN LIFE (2d ed. 193i) 525-527. The desirability of paying prevailing
wages on public works projects has been recognized not only by agencies for social research
[e. g., CoLcoiw, EmERoGEcy Wopx R rtuz (Russel Sage Foundation, 1932) 243], but even,
apparently, by the legislature of Massachusetts. See MASS. GEN. LAWS (Ter. ed. 1932) c.
149, § 26, which requires payment of prevailing wage rates to laborers in the construction of
public works. Such considerations as these are obviously relevant to the question of the "rea-
sonableness" of defendant's demand in the instant case.
9. Such a requirement might, for example, destroy the well-established rights of striking,
and of bargaining collectively.
10. Peonage is defined as a status or condition of compulsory service based on the serv-
ant's indebtedness to the master. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U. S. 207, 215 (1905) ; cf.
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219 (1911), which held unconstitutional under the Thirteenth
Amendment an Alabama statute declaring that a laborer's failure to perform a contract of
labor should be deemed "prima facie" evidence that he had entered into the contract with a
fraudulent intent, for which offense criminal punishment was provided. Holmes and Lauton,
JJ., dissented.
II. See Zitlow v. State, 213 Wis. 493, 497, 252 N. W. 358, 36o (I934), cited note 4,
supra: "The question really involved is whether a person, engaged in a dispute with his em-
ployer, based upon his contention, made in good faith, that the working conditions are unjust
or intolerable, may express his objection or enforce his contention by refusing to work, with-
out subjecting himself to the penalty imposed by this section. We see no difference in the
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Landlord and Tenant-Term for Years-Rights of Defaulting Lessee
under a Covenant to Renew or Pay for Improvements-Lessor and lessee
mutually covenanted in a lease of land, that at the expiration thereof, the lessor
should have the option either of renewal or of paying for improvements made by
the lessee; at a price, in either event, to be fixed by arbitration in case of dis-
agreement between the parties. Lessee's suit for damages for breach of this
covenant was summarily dismissed because of arrears in the payment of rent.
Held, reversing the court below, that there was nothing in the lease which made
the covenant to renew or pay dependent on payment of the rent by the lessee.
Berry v. Stuyvesant, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 26, 1935, at I (App. Div., Ist Dep't 1935).
In considering the instant case, it must perforce be assumed that the inter-
pretation placed on the lease by the court was correct.' Dealing with the matter
then as simply one of independence of covenants, there is ample authority to
support the position that was taken.2 But considering the problem as that of the
right of the lessee to compel performance of the renewal clause on the part of the
lessor when the lessee is in default in some other covenant, without resolving
the matter into one of the independence of covenants, there is authority contrary
to the result reached herein.3 Such covenants for renewal are quite generally
enforced,4 though the possibility of this result being reached is decreased where,
as in the instant case, there is provision made for arbitration to settle the renewal
rental, since the courts will not ordinarily force a party to arbitrate.5 Moreover,
the lessor's option in the principal case constituted a further difficulty in the way
of enforcement, for the courts are disinclined to enforce a contract which is in the
alternative.6 But there is authority which would, in an appropriate suit, force the
application of this question between the county and any other employer." "Exceptional"
services to the state are of course not within the ban of the Thirteenth Amendment. Robert-
son v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275 (1897) (deserting sailor) ; Butler v. Perry, 240 U. S. 328
(1916) (citizens' obligation to work on roads).
I. It is unfortunate that the court in its opinion saw fit to reproduce only those portions
of the lease which dealt with the option and the method of arbitration in case of dispute, par-
ticularly in view of the court's assertion that "in all cases the lease is searched to determine
the intent of the parties." Thus in Bates v. Johnston, 58 Hun 528, 12 N. Y. Supp. 403 (Sup.
Ct.), af'd, 126 N. Y. 681, 28 N. E. 249 (I8go), the court came to the conclusion that cove-
nants similar to those in the principal case, were dependent, because the lease further con-
tained a provision for re-entry on breach of a covenant, in which case the lessors were to
resume possession "as in their first and former estate." Though it is also true that a court
will not imply a forfeiture of rights under a lease [Parsons v. Ball 205 Ky. 793, 266 S. W.
649 (1924)]; and will assist in avoiding a forfeiture. Giles v. Austin, 62 N. Y. 486 (1875).
2. Whitcomb v. Indianapolis Traction Co., 64 Ind. App. 605, 116 N. E. 444 (1917) ; Fer-
gen v. Lyons, 162 Wis. 131, 55 N. W. 935 (ii6). Similarly, effect is given to the parties'
expression that the covenant for renewal shall be dependent on performance of other cove-
nants. Swift v. Occidental Mining & Petroleum Co., 141 Cal. 161, 74 Pac. 700 (903) ; Man-
chester Amusement Co. v. Connecticut, 8o N. H. 455, 119 A. 69 (1922).
3. Felder v. Hall Bros. Co., 151 Ark. 182, 235 S. W. 789 (1921) (action for unlawful
detainer) ; Gannett v. Albree, 1O3 Mass. 372 (1869) ; Upton v. Hosmer, 70 N. H. 493, 49 Atl.
96 (19O1). A search of the recent cases reveals only these few authorities directly on the
point.
4. Hunter v. Silvers, 15 Ill. 174 (1853) ; Bergstein v. Bergquist, 152 Minn. 358, 189 N.
W. 120 (1922) ; McClintock v. Joyner, 77 Miss. 678, 27 So. 837 (1900) ; Crawford v. Kast-
nor, 26 Hun 440 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1882).
5. Despite the general rule that an agreement to arbitrate will not be enforced in the
absence of special circumstances, there is authority to the contrary where the covenant is
mutually binding, as it was in the principal case. Johnson v. Conger, 14 Abb. Pr. 195 (N. Y.
Sup. Ct. 1861) ; Faucett v. Northern Clay Co., 84 Wash. 382, 146 Pac. 857 (915) ; see Hols-
man v. Abrams, 2 Duer 435, 446 (Super. Ct. N. Y. City, 1853).
6. Davis v. Isenstein, 257 IIl. 260, ioo N. E. 940 (1913) ; Safron v. David McBurney &
Son, 269 Pa. 392, 112 Atl. 677 (1921).
RECENT CASES
lessor to decide between the two courses of action which were open to him.
7
Thus it is apparent that had the suit herein been to compel performance of this
covenant, rather than for damages for its breach, the result might have been
contrary to that actually reached in the case under consideration. Herein, the
damages were likely to be slight, inasmuch as it appeared that lessee's improve-
ments were negligible, as well as that there was no rental specified for the term
of renewal.8
States-Debt Limitation-Application of Constitutional Debt Lim-
itation to Obligations Payable from Special Fund-The Colorado legislature
passed acts I providing that the highway department was authorized to receive
from the federal government up to $25,000,000 for road construction; that a
special highway fund would be created out of which the principal and interest on
the advance would be paid; and that all future revenue from specified sources,
indluding gasoline tax and automobile license fees, would be paid into the fund.
The most that could be borrowed under the constitution was $100,000.2 Held,
that the act did not create a "debt" within the constitutional prohibition, because
payment of the obligation could never place any burden on revenues available for
appropriation to general state purposes.8 Johnson v. McDonald, 49 P. (2d)
1017 (Colo. 1935).
It is well settled that if obligations are payable only from the revenue to be
realized from the particular utility or property which has been acquired with
the proceeds of the loan, they do not constitute "debts" within the meaning of a
constitutional debt limitation. 4 The rationale of the rule is that such an obli-
gation is never a general liability of the state. Examples of its application
include cases of municipalities or states issuing bonds to finance the construction
of electric light plants,5 water works, 6 canals,7 and bridges,8 the obligation to
be paid solely from charges and tolls collected. But dissents have been expressed
in recent cases where the doctrine has been extended, as in the instant case, to
provide for a vast indebtedness payable from what would otherwise be a major
source of revenue for general purposes.9 The court in the instant case reasoned,
7. Smith v. Rector of St. Philip's Church, 1o7 N. Y. 61o, 14 N. E. 825 (1888) ; see Hols-
man v. Abrams, 2 Duer 435, 446 (N. Y. 1853) ; Columbia University v. Kalvin, 25o N. Y.
469, 474, 166 N. E. 169, 171 (1929). Moreover, in the lease in the principal case there was a
provision that if the lessor did not renew the lease, he would pay for the improvements.
8. The lessor's valuation of the improvements is mentioned in the report. On the meas-
ure of damages, as being the difference between the agreed rental and the value at date of
the breach, see Indian Head Mills v. Hamilton, 212 Ala. 97, I1 So. 747 (1924) ; Freiheit v.
Broch, 98 Conn. 166, 118 Atl. 828 (1922) ; Stern Co. v. Friedman, 229 Mich. 623, 2O N. W.
96, (1925).
i. Colo. Laws 1935, c. 124, p. 462; c. i8I, p. 941.
2. CoLO. CONsT. art. XI, §§ 3, 4.
3. Plaintiff attacked the constitutionality of the act on nine grounds, of which the one
under discussion was of principal importance. None of the plaintiff's contentions was upheld.
4. California Toll Bridge Authority v. Kelly, 218 Cal. 7, 21 P. (2d) 425 (i933). See
cases cited infra, 5 to 8.
5. Shields v. Loveland, 74 Colo. 27, 218 Pac. 913 (i923).
6. Seward v. Bowers, 37 N. M. 385, 24 P. (2d) 253 (i933).
7. In re Canal Certificates, ig Colo. 63, 34 Pac. 274 (1893).
8. Alabama State Bridge Corp. v. Smith, 217 Ala. 311, 116 So. 695 (1928).
9. Instant case at 1032; State ex rel. Boynton v. State Highway Comm., 138 'Kan. 913,
28 P. (2d) 770 (1934) ; Moses v. Meier, 148 Ore. i85, 35 P. (2d) 98I (I934) ; Briggs v.
Greenville County, 137 S. C. 288, 135 S. E. 153 (1926) ; cf. In. re Senate Resolution No. 2,
94 Colo. 101, 31 P. (2d) 325 (i933).
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however, that the facts fell within the general rule.10 The extended special fund
doctrine has been upheld by other courts on the ground that the debts referred to
in the limitation are debts to be paid only from a general property tax." The
force of the latter argument, however, is spent, for the general property tax is
no longer the principal source of revenue.' Moreover, the purpose of the con-
stitutional limitation is to keep states substantially on a cash basis, and to prohibit
the pledge of future fixed revenues, so that one legislature cannot paralyze
the next by devouring revenues otherwise available to both.' 3 If the extended
construction of the special fund doctrine, as adopted in the instant case, is gener-
ally accepted, the efficacy of the debt limitation will be destroyed; for it is con-
ceivable that all sources of future revenue could be designated to make up special
funds and pledged to pay for present expenditures. 4
Suretyship-Rights and Remedies of Surety-Priority over Material-
men When Payment of Full Penalty on Bond Only Partially Satisfied
Claims of Materialmen-Contractor properly completed work for the United
States, but failed to pay materialmen as required by his contract with the govern-
ment. Claimant, surety on the bond given to protect the United States and the
materialmen,' paid the penalty on the bond upon the contractor's bankruptcy, and
the money was ratably distributed to the materialmen, still leaving a balance due
from the contractor. Claimant asserted that, by subrogation to the rights of con-
tractor and by virtue of an indemnity contract 2 executed by contractor prior to
the date of the bond, it was entitled to priority in a fund representing retained
percentages 3 paid by the government to the contractor's trustee. Held (Rob-
erts, J., dissenting 4), that the materialmen should prevail over the surety, be-
cause a surety is not entitled to subrogation until the principal's obligation is fully
performed, and because the rights of the materialmen cannot be cut off by a con-
tract between the surety and his principal. American Surety Co. v. Westing-
house Elec. Mfg. Co., 56 Sup. Ct. 9 (1935).
As was pointed out in a previous issue of this REvIEw,5 these facts presented
no reason for an exception to the general rule that a surety has an equitable right
Io. See instant case at 1O25.
ii. See State ex reL. Boynton v. State Highway Comm., 138 Kan. 913, 916, 28 P. (2d)
770, 772 (1934) ; Briggs v. Greenville County, 137 S. C. 288, 301, 135 S. E. 153, 157 (1926).
12. See U. S. CENSUS, FINANCIAL STATISTICS OF STATES (1929) 13: "The general prop-
erty tax is the principle source of revenue from 1915 to 1922, inclusive, but for subsequent
years it is exceeded by receipts from business and non-business taxes." The report indicates
the varying degree to which states depend on the general property tax for revenue. Pennsyl-
vania and North Carolina reported no receipts from the general property tax in 1929.
13. See People ex rel. Seeley v. May, 9 Colo. 8o, 95, 1o Pac. 641, 649 (1886) ; In re
Senate Resolution No. 2, 94 Colo. 101, 119, 31 P. (2d) 325, 332 (933).
14. See Crick v. Rash, 19o Ky. 820, 836, 229 S. W. 63, 70 (1921).
I. Such a bond is required by 33 STAT. 811 (1905), 40 U. S. C. A. §270 (1928) (the
"Heard Act").
2. The contract provided that, if contractor's breach should make it necessary for surety
to pay, surety should be subrogated to contractor's rights for any sum due on the contract,
including "deferred payments."
3. Part of the price was held back by the government under the contract until the work
had been completed. This fund was insufficient to satisfy both surety and materialmen.
4. Mr. Justice Roberts dissented on the ground that the fund should be turned into the
general assets of the bankrupt, and that neither of the parties should be allowed priority.
The majority opinion refused to consider the rights of other creditors, on the ground that
the record failed to show the existence of any other creditors.
5. (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1034.
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to be subrogated to the rights in the principal's creditors only after the creditors
have been paid in full.6 In the light of the purpose of the bond, the Court's hold-
ing as to the effect of the contract for indemnity was not only correct but merito-
rious.
7
Taxation-Manufacturer's Tax-Fair Market Price as Based on Sales
by Manufacturer to Wholly Owned Subsidiary-Plaintiff, manufacturer of
perfumes, owned all shares in sales corporation which handled manufacturer's
products. Plaintiff sold products to sales corporation at cost plus ten per cent,
plus one and one-half per cent, plus tax. A Federal statute 1 places a tax on ar-
ticles of the type manufactured by plaintiff corporation amounting to ten per cent
of the "fair market price" of the product. The statute also provides that, "If any
article is sold [otherwise than through an arm's length transaction] at less than
the fair market price, the tax shall . . . be computed on the price for which
such articles are sold, in ordinary course of trade by manufacturers or producers
thereof as determined by the commissioner." 2 Plaintiff sued to recover taxes
paid. Held, that the sales to the sales corporation were not at the fair market
price, that the transaction was not at arm's length, and that the commissioner had
therefore properly computed the tax on the basis of the price received by sales
corporation in sales to the trade. Bourjois, Inc. v. McGowan, U. S. L. Week,
Dec. 3, 1935, at 8 (W. D. N. Y. 1935).
Under the statute the commissioner's determination of the "fair market
price" was limited to the situation where (i) the manufacturer sold the article
at less than the fair market price, and (2) the transaction was not at "arm's
length." Ordinarily the fair market price is that price charged for the article or
similar articles in the open market.3 Where, however, the article is of a special
or peculiar nature, the fair market price is that charged by the individual con-
trolling its sale in the open market.4  Plaintiff corporation in the instant case
manufactured an article sold under a particular brand name,5 and therefore
largely controlled its price. If the plaintiff corporation be regarded as one en-
gaged solely in the manufacture of its product and not in the distribution of it,
the fair market price would be that charged by it in its sales to the sales corpora-
tion.' If, however, the plaintiff corporation be regarded as not only a manufac-
turing corporation but also one engaged in the distribution of the manufactured
product-a process involving attendant costs of advertising, sales promotion, etc.
-the fair market price would seem to be that price received in sales to the trade.
The ultimate inquiry, therefore, is concerned with the question of the identity be-
tween the plaintiff corporation and its solely-owned subsidiary sales corporation.
It has been held that ordinarily the corporate entity will not be disregarded in tax
6. Jenkins v. National Surety Co. 277 U. S. 258 (1928).
7. In the words o~f Justice Cardozo: "Equity then forbids that the statutory security be
whittled down indirectly by any promise of indemnity, general or specific." Instant case
at 12.
i. Revenue Act, 1932, § 6o3, 26 U. S. C. A., c. 20, n. (Supp. J935).
2. Revenue Act, 1932, § 619 (b) (3), 26 U. S. C. A., c. 2o, n. (Supp. 1935).
3. Poppenberg v. Owen & Co., 84 Misc. 226, 146 N. Y. Supp. 478 (Sup. Ct. 1924), aff'd,
222 N. Y. 569, II6 N. E. IO7O (1917).
4. Ibid.
5. Plaintiff corporation manufactured "Bourjois" and "Barbara Gould" cosmetics, both
of which were well-advertised and were sold on the basis of the goodwill generated by the
names "Bourjois" and "Barbara Gould."
6. Witnesses for the plaintiff corporation testified that manufacturers of similar products
received cost plus ten per cent, plus one and one-half per cent, in sales to sales corporations.
It would seem that this would be a fair market price in sales by manufacturers alone, not
distributing their products.
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matters.7 Moreover, the fact that a corporation has been formed with the mo-
tive to escape taxation is said to be immaterial.
8 However, the courts have been
astute either to sustain or to disregard the corporate entity depending on which
attitude was necessary to prevent tax evasion.9 In the instant case, therefore, it
is not surprising that the court disregarded the separate entity of the solely-owned
sales corporation and held that in reality the plaintiff corporation was engaged
not only in the manufacturing but also in the distribution of its product.Y0 That
the transaction was not at "arm's length" is obvious in view of the close affiliation
between plaintiff corporation and the sales subsidiary. The decision achieves the
result probably intended to flow from the operation of the statute:" prevention
of tax-dodging by the use of the familiar device of the dummy or subsidiary
corporation.
Workmen's Compensation Acts-Construction-Attorney as Employee
within Meaning of Compensation Act-Plaintiff was an attorney employed
by defendant on a monthly retainer. He maintained an independent office, where
he engaged in the active practice of his profession. While returning to his office
after a conference with defendant's officers concerning defendant's affairs, plain-
tiff was injured. He brought suit under the local Workmen's Compensation
Act, which defined "employee" as including "Every person in the service of any
person . . . under any contract of hire, express or implied. . . ." Held,
that plaintiff was an employee of defendant within the meaning of the statute.
Skaggs Co. v. Nixon, 50 P. (2d) 55 (Colo. 1935).
At common law, the employment of a physician 2 or nurse 3 to render pro-
fessional services in specific instances did not create the relationship of master
and servant; the employer was not liable to a third party for the malpractice of the
person engaged. Likewise, an attorney retained to handle designated legal matters
was not treated as an ordinary employee.4 Under Workmen's Compensation Acts,
7. Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co., 287 U. S. 415 (1932) ; Burnet v. Clark,
287 U. S. 410 (1932) ; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 69 F. (2d)
699 (C. C. A. Ist, 1934).
8. "The question always is whether the transaction under scrutiny is in fact what it ap-
pears to be in form." L. Hand, J., in Chisholm v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 79 F.
(2d) 14 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; see Eaton v. White, 7o F. (2d) 449, 451 (C. C. A. Ist, 1934).
9. Cases upholding the corporate entity: Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co., 287
U. S. 415 (1932) ; Burnet v. Clark, 287 U. S. 410 (1932); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, 69 F. (2d) 699 (C. C. A. Ist, 1934) ; New Colonial Ice Co.
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 66 F. (2d) 480 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) ; see In re Collin,
75 F. (2d) 62, 64 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934). Cases disregarding the corporate entity: Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 (1934) ; Bass v. Hawley, 62 F. (2d) 721 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) ; cf.
Met. Holding Co. v. Snyder, 79 F. (2d) 263 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935).
Io. Officers of plaintiff corporation were officers of the sales corporation. The court
concluded that plaintiff corporation dictated the price received by sales corporation in sales to
the trade.
iI. Revenue Act, 1932, § 61g (b) (3), 26 U. S. C. A., c. 2o, n. (935).
i. Colo. Laws 1931, c. 175, § I, amending Colo. Laws 1927, c. 197, § 2.
2. York v. Chicago, etc., Ry., 98 Iowa 544, 67 N. W. 574 (1896) ; Pearl v. West End
St. Ry., 176 Mass. 177, 57 N. E. 339 (19oo) ; Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,
211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914) ; MOLL, INDEPENDENT CONTRACrORS (1910) § 38 (k).
3. Parkes v. Seasongood, 152 Fed. 583 (C. C. D. R. I. 1907) ; MOLL, INDEPENDENT CON-
7RACTORS (IgIO) § 38 (k) ; see Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N. Y.
125, 132, 105 N. E. 92, 94 (1914) ; cf. Phillips v. Buffalo Gen. Hospital, 239 N. Y. I88, 146
N. E. 199 (1924) (hospital orderly).
4. A statute or court order directing the receiver of an insolvent debtor to prefer the
wage claims of employees has been held not applicable to an attorney's charges for professional
services. Louisville, etc., R. R. v. Wilson, 138 U. S. 5Ol (18g) ; Lewis v. Fisher, 8o Md.
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also, nurses 5 and physicians 6 engaged for isolated cases are not "employees" en-
titled to relief, but "independent contractors." However, where the services are
continuous, and the person rendering them devotes his practice exclusively to a
single employer for a periodic stipend, the mere fact that he is a member of a "pro-
fession" does not change his status as an employee. 7 A contract whereby a lawyer
engages to handle all the legal business of another party for a stipulated recom-
pense at stated intervals, though free to carry on an independent practice, falls
between these two extremes. Such agreement, at common law, has not been
considered as making the attorney an employee for certain purposes.8 Apparently,
the only previous case which determined the legal effect of such a contract under
a Workmen's Compensation Act was Industrial Com. v. Moynihan9 also decided
by the Colorado Supreme Court, which reached the same result as the instant
case. The Moynihan decision was based upon the employer's right to control,
as indicated by his right to terminate the relationship at any time without liability.
The general rule is that a client is not liable for damages for breaching a contract
to employ an attorney,10 though at least one court has recognized an exception
where the agreement calls for a periodic general retainer, such as existed in the
instant case. It has sometimes been pointed out that the policy of such legis-
lation is to grant relief to workmen. On this theory it has been held that it
would be incongruous to permit recovery by executives, as distinguished from
"employees", as that term is applied in common speech.' 2  Such a distinction
seems unwarranted by the statutory definition of "employee"; it would be prefer-
able to determine whether the relationship of master and servant exists by appli-
cation of the accepted tests '- to the contract in question.
139, 30 Ad. 6o8 (1894) ; People v. Remington & Sons, 45 Hun 329 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1887),
aff'd, io9 N. Y. 631, 16 N. E. 680 (1888). Contra: Gurney v. Atlantic & G. W. Ry., 58 N_ Y.
358 (1874). Likewise, statutes imposing upon stockholders liability .for wages due laborers
and employees, do not include debts due attorneys for professional services, even though the
attorney receives a fixed salary. Bristor v. Smith, 158 N. Y. 157, 53 N. E. 42 (1899) ; Bris-
tor v. Kretz, 22 Misc. 55, 49 N. Y. Supp. 404 (Sup. Ct. 1897) ; 6 THOMPSON, CoRoRATroNs
(3d ed. 1927) § 4877.
5. Moody v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 204 Cal. 668, 269 Pac. 542 (1928); Matter of
Renouf v. New York Central R. R., 254 N. Y. 349, 173 N. E. 218 (1930); Matter of Brown
v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 222 App. Div. 402, 226 N. Y. Supp. 317 (3d Dep't 1928) ; SAMP-
SON, WORKMNm'S COMPENSATION (1915) 14. Contra: Williamson v. St. Catherine's Hospi-
tal, 2 Cal. Ind. Acc. Comm. 448 (1915).
6. Murphy v. Enniscorthy Board of Guardians, 42 Ir. L. T. 246 (1908); SAMPSON,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1915) 15.
7. Matter of Bernstein v. Beth Israel Hospital, 236 N. Y. 268, 140 N. E. 694 (1923)
(interne) ; Getzlaff v. Enloe, 3 Cal. Ind. Acc. Comm. 18 (i9i6) (physician) ; Visiting Nurse
Ass'n v. Industrial Comm., I95 Wis. 159, 217 N. W. 646 (1928) (nurse) semble.
8. Thus, an attorney injured while riding on his client's public vehicle was permitted to
recover under a policy insuring "passengers", the court holding that he was not an employee.
United States Casualty Co. v. Ellison, 65 Colo. 252, 176 Pac. 279 (1918). See also note 4,
supra. But see Greenberg v. Remick & Co., 23o N. Y. 70, 75, 129 N. E. 211, 212 (1920).
9. 94 Colo. 438, 32 P. (2d) 802 (1934) ; cf. Getzlaff v. Enloe, 3 Cal. Ind. Acc. Comm. 8
(0916) (physician under a similar type of contract permitted to recover under Workmen's
Compensation Act).
1o. See authorities collected in 19 ANN. CAS. 592 (19ii).
ii. Greenberg v. Remick & Co., 230 N. Y. 70, 129 N. E. 211 (192o).
12. Donaldson v. Donaldson Co., 176 Minn. 422, 223 N. W. 772 (929) ; Matter of
Bowne v. Bowne Co., 221 N. Y. 28, i16 N. E. 364 (1917) ; Carville v. Bornot & Co., 288 Pa.
104, 135 Atl. 652 (1927). But cf. Ii re Raynes, 66 Ind. App. 321, 118 N. E. 387 (1917);
Matter of Skouitchi v. Chic Cloak & Suit Co., 230 N. Y. 296, 130 N. E. 299 (1920).
13. The right of "master" to control "servant" (including the right to dismiss); the
right of "master" to direct the methods adopted by "servant"; control of premises by "mas-
ter"; absence of an independent business maintained by "servant"; etc.
